SUPREME COURT MINUTES
WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 9, 2013
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

S213696 A139502 First Appellate District, Div. 3 **GOLDEN STATE DEVELOPERS, INC. v. S.C. (TRUCK INSURANCE EXCHANGE)**

Petition stricken (case closed)
The petition for review filed September 30, 2013, in the above-entitled matter is hereby stricken as the petition was filed in error.

S208843 B231038 Second Appellate District, Div. 4 **PEOPLE v. WHITMER (JEFFREY ALLEN)**

Extension of time granted
On application of respondent and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the time to serve and file the answer brief on the merits is extended to November 5, 2013.
No further extensions of time shall be contemplated.

S213858 H040177 Sixth Appellate District **OJEDA (MARTIN RAMIREZ) v. S.C. (PEOPLE)**

Order filed
To permit consideration of the petition for review filed herein, all further proceedings in *People v. Martin Ojeda*, Monterey County Superior Court No. SS121658A, are hereby stayed pending further order of this court.

SUPREME COURT MINUTES
WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 9, 2013
SPECIAL SESSION – UC BERKELEY SCHOOL OF LAW
BERKELEY, CALIFORNIA

The Supreme Court of California convened for its special session at the University of Berkeley School of Law, 215 Boalt Hall, Berkeley, California, on Wednesday, October 9, 2013, at 10:00 a.m.

Present: Chief Justice Tani Cantil-Sakauye, presiding, and Associate Justices Kennard, Baxter, Werdegar, Chin, Corrigan, and Liu.

Officers present: Frank A. McGuire, Clerk; Jorge Navarrete, Assistant Clerk Administrator; and Gail Gray, Calendar Coordinator.

S194951

Richard Sander et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
State Bar of California et al., Defendants and Respondents.

Cause called. James M. Wagstaffe, State Bar of California, argued for Respondents.
James Chadwick argued for Appellants.
Jean-Paul Jassy argued for Appellants.

Mr. Wagstaffe replied.
Cause submitted.

Court recessed until 1:00 p.m. this date

Court reconvened pursuant to recess.
Members of the court and officers present as first shown.

S203124

Jerry Beeman and Pharmacy Services, Inc. et al.,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
v.
Anthem Prescription Management, LLC et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.

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And Consolidated Case

Cause called. Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr. argued for Appellants.
Michael A. Bowse argued for Respondents.

Mr. Boutrous replied.
Cause submitted.

S058019

The People, Respondent,
v.
George Lopez Contreras, Appellant.

Cause called. Denise Anton, Office of the Public Defender, argued for Appellant.
Christina Hitomi Simpson, Office of the Attorney General, argued for Respondent.

Ms. Anton replied.
Cause submitted.

Court adjourned.

***SUPREME COURT MINUTES**
WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 9, 2013
SPECIAL SESSION – UC BERKELEY SCHOOL OF LAW
BERKELEY, CALIFORNIA
REMARKS BY CHIEF JUSTICE TANI CANTIL-SAKAUYE

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Officers present: Frank A. McGuire, Clerk; Jorge Navarrete, Assistant Clerk Administrator; and Gail Gray, Calendar Coordinator.

CHIEF JUSTICE CANTIL-SAKAUYE: Good morning. Welcome to oral argument. The California Supreme Court is pleased to be holding oral argument here at Berkeley School of Law.

I'd like to begin with introducing the Supreme Court Justices. I introduce them in order of seniority on the California Supreme Court.

To my right is Justice Joyce Kennard. To my left is Justice Marvin Baxter. Next in order, we have Justice Kay Werdegar. And we also next in order have Justice Ming Chin. Justice Carol Corrigan. Justice Goodwin Liu. And I'm Chief Justice Tani Cantil-Sakauye and I welcome Dean Gillian Lester for some remarks.

DEAN LESTER: Thank you, Chief Justice and members of the court. I want to express my deepest appreciation, both personally and on behalf of Berkeley Law School for your visit here today.

I'd also like to thank the staff of the Supreme Court of California. I would like to thank the California Constitution Center and its executive director David Carrillo. And I'd like to thank the Constitutional Rights Foundation Mock Trial students for making this day possible.

This is the second time that Berkeley Law has partnered with the California Supreme Court to present a conference and special session.

Berkeley Law is the world's preeminent public law school, and there's no better place than Berkeley Law to learn about our state constitution and our high court.

Our California Constitution Center is the only research institute at any law school devoted to the study of our state's constitution and high court, and Berkeley Law is so proud that -- of its history with so many justices of the Supreme Court: Professor and alumnus Roger Traynor, Professors Frank Newman and Goodwin Liu; and graduates Allen E. Broussard, Cruz Reynoso, Kathryn Werdegar, and Rose Bird.

I'm deeply pleased to see Berkeley Law and the Supreme Court working together to invigorate scholarly interest in the work of the high court, to invite the court to engage with the academy, and to expose our students to the working of the court, the working of the court system, hopefully, as a prelude to judicial externships, clerkships, and let me not hesitate to add, possible future careers in the judiciary.

Today, you will experience a constitutional branch of state government in action. I waive behind me to the audience.

Justices of the California Supreme Court, we are so grateful to you for reaching out to the public in this way and reminding us how very fortunate we are to have an institution such as this. Onward.

CHIEF JUSTICE CANTIL-SAKAUYE: Thank you, Dean Lester. At this point I would like to introduce to you two very important people on our staff for whom this outreach session could not have happened. These two people take care of the details and make sure that there is a great connection and communication with our court, with Berkeley School of Law.

I'd like to now introduce our clerk of the court, Frank McGuire, and also Jorge Navarrete from the clerk's office.

Before we begin and take questions from the students, I want to say that we are privileged to be here, to be hosted by Berkeley School of Law. And as you know, the California Supreme Court, as a state court, sits in three different locations to hear oral argument in our court. We sit in Sacramento, Los Angeles, and San Francisco.

We do try to reserve October or November as an outreach session where the court takes oral argument to the people, to the public schools, in an effort to further elucidate what we do and to take part in the outreach to included civics education of the third branch government. And that's what we intend to do here, and we look forward to your questions.

At this time, we will begin questions. I believe there are a total of seven questions. But before we do that, I would like to -- Well, we will start with the seven questions. And I believe you will come up to the microphone and ask your questions to the justices. Please introduce yourself.

MS. SHERRY: Good morning Madame Chief Justice and associate justices of the court. My name is Ida Sherry and I'm a third year law student. The California Supreme Court typically has a draft opinion prepared prior to oral argument. How does this practice affect both oral argument itself and, of course, ultimate decision in a given case.

CHIEF JUSTICE CANTIL-SAKAUYE: Justice Kennard.

JUSTICE KENNARD: Thank you, Chief Justice.

I hope that my voice carries throughout the entire room. If not, I assume there will be lots of people who voice complaints, and I will take appropriate action.

Before a case is placed on the oral argument calendar, the justice to whom the case is assigned is given the task of preparing a draft opinion that is circulated to each of the colleagues, and each colleague must respond in kind.

They comment, express agreement, which often Justice courts hope for, or a disagreement with either the analysis or the resolution, or perhaps both. It is not at all unusual for an authoring justice to receive various pages of comments containing suggestions, containing some critique, or perhaps much critique.

Ideally, a proposed opinion has garnered a majority vote before it is placed on the oral argument calendar.

Because the authoring justices proposed opinion has been rigorously analyzed and dissected by the responding chambers, the justices at oral argument are quite familiar with the issues presented and with the problematic areas presented in a particular case.

Contrary to popular belief, the draft opinion, or as it's called, the tentative opinion, is not set in stone, especially the close or highly complex case. It is during oral argument that one or more difficult issues can be flushed out, it is hoped.

As a result of the colloquy between the justices and the attorneys for the opposing side, in this regard, it's important for participating counsel to listen carefully to the questions posed and to respond candidly in an effort to assist the court in coming up with a resolution that is called for under the law, or in the particular case.

When the attorneys don't do that, oral argument can be quite frustrating. Even in easier cases, oral argument can assist the court in refining the focus of the issues, thereby clarifying the ultimate resolution of the case.

I consider oral argument the means of testing the strength or the weakness of the proposed draft that has been circulated to the justices before oral argument. The best oral advocates can explain the logic of their own arguments and identify the flaws in opposing counsel's argument.

Again, that is to the assistance of the court. Occasionally, oral argument can lead one or more justices to abandon the position taken before oral argument, if as a result of oral argument, three justices are no longer with the authoring justices proposed our draft opinion, the authoring justice no longer has a majority, which requires agreement by four of the seven justices.

As to the hurdles then faced by the authoring justices, who as a result of oral argument has lost the majority, that is the topic that goes beyond the scope of the time allotted to me to respond to the question.

CHIEF JUSTICE CANTIL-SAKAUYE: Thank you very much.

MR. BLUMENTHAL: Good morning Madame Chief Justice and associate justices of the court. My name is Aaron Blumenthal, and I'm a second year law student.

Justice Liu, unlike your colleagues, a majority of your chamber staff is comprised of annual law clerks rather than long-term staff attorneys. What led you to employ the annual law clerk approach? What are its benefits and any detriments?

JUSTICE LIU: Thank you for the question. And it's wonderful to be back at Boalt. Let me say, first, that the decision about who you have on your chamber staff is an intensely personal one, and every justice makes up his or her own mind about what composition of staff he or she wants.

And I say it's an intensely personal one because the environment of a chamber staff is a very intimate one. As appellate judges, we spend our time largely with that small family of people day in and day out. And so that staff has to have a good chemistry, and you have to really enjoy spending time with your staff.

For me, I think the considerations are threefold. First of all, I have had my own personal experience as a law clerk in the federal system. I've had the good fortune to clerk twice; once for a federal Circuit Court of Appeal, and another opportunity at the U.S. Supreme Court, and I saw the benefits of the annual law clerk system. And I thought it would be useful to have in my own chambers a balance between long years of experience, which the career attorneys provide, with the fresh perspectives of new people who come in year and year out. I think that's the first thing.

The second thing is, I have a selfish reason, which is I like to have a sort of extended family of law clerks who I can sort of mentor and watch them grow into attorneys and watch how their careers unfold and be helpful in some way to their lives long after they are gone from my chambers. And that's, I think, a very fulfilling part of the job.

And thirdly, I think, institutionally it helps to have people who have some inside perspective of how our court functions, what its processes are and what its concerns are, who then go back out into the profession as lawyers, as future judges, as professors, perhaps as business leaders or journalists or whatever they end up doing. And they carry with them some part of our court and its tradition.

And to have all these alumni, I think, out there, is a great benefit, institutionally, to the court. So my practice, I think, is just a small contribution to that enterprise.

And I love to hire law clerks from Boalt.

CHIEF JUSTICE CANTIL-SAKAUYE: Thank you, Mr. Blumenthal.

MS. EN: Good morning justices. My name is Solida En. I'm a senior at Terra Linda High School.

What is the process for removing a sitting California Supreme Court Justice from office? How does the process of such removal affect the independence of the state judiciary?

JUSTICE CHIN: That's a very interesting question. I'm trying very hard not to take it very personally. I certainly hope that your question does not presuppose that you have any of us in mind.

When I started formulating my answer, I thought maybe I should be as vague and obtuse and confusing as possible. But I rejected that idea. It's a direct question that deserves a direct answer.

There are several ways that justices can be removed. First, the Legislature, using the impeachment process, can remove sitting justices for, quote, misconduct. The state Assembly begins the process. The state Senate has to finish it. A sitting justice can be removed if two-thirds of the Senate votes for removal.

Second, sitting justices can be removed by the Commission on Judicial Performance. This commission judges the conduct of all judges in California, not just the Supreme Court. The commission can remove sitting justices for committing, quote, willful misconduct in office, for consistently failing to perform duties, for habitually using drugs or alcohol, or for conduct that's prejudicial to the administration of justice or brings the judicial office in disrepute. The commission can remove a sitting judge for a felony conviction or a conviction of any other crime of moral turpitude.

I don't think that either of these methods for removing sitting judges has very much effect on the independence of California's judges. Both are rarely used, fortunately. They usually only begin because of a substantial reason. As long as sitting justices and judges try hard to do their jobs, conduct themselves appropriately, they aren't really at risk of being removed by the legislature or the commission because of the content of their decisions. And that's the important part of judicial independence that we always have to keep in mind.

We don't want judges raising their hands to test the political winds every time they are called upon to make difficult decisions.

Now, the citizens of California also have several ways that they can remove a sitting justice. When a vacancy occurs on the court, the governor gets to fill the appointment. At the first election after being appointed by the governor, a new justice has to appear on the ballot, and the voters are asked to confirm the appointment.

Later, when the justices terms end, they must decide whether to run for retention again. If they do, their names appear on the ballot, and the voters are asked to indicate whether they want to retain them.

They are retained if a majority of voters vote for a new term. If the majority does not vote to retain them, then the Governor gets to appoint someone to take their place. This has been the process in California since 1934.

The voters can also remove sitting justices through the recall process. This requires a recall petition with the Secretary of State that has been signed by the requisite number of voters to qualify for the ballot. If the petition gets on the ballot, the justice is removed if the majority of those voting in that election vote so.

Because these methods necessarily involve elections, they are, by necessity, somewhat political.

In 1934, the Commonwealth Club of California, which I have been active in for many years -- it is the oldest public interest forum in the country -- did a study. It studied the appointment, selection and retention of appellate judges in the state.

On the one hand, they considered the federal system, which involves a lifetime appointment. All U.S. Supreme Court Justices serve for life; all those on the Courts of Appeal and all those federal district court trial judges have those seats for life – they can only be removed for misconduct.

On the other hand, the commission of the Commonwealth Club looked at partisan political elections, and believe it or not, some states have those. Fortunately, we did not get that. The Commonwealth Club came up with what I think is the hybrid system, and I think, really, the ideal system. That is, the appointment process with the retention election so that the voters still have a hand in deciding whether or not the judges should continue to sit.

Now, does this involve the question of judicial independence? I think somewhat. But I think the involvement, at least in California, has been reasonable. Many people will disagree with that, but I think for the last almost 80 years, the system has worked well in California.

Thank you for your question.

CHIEF JUSTICE CANTIL-SAKAUYE: Thank you, Ms. En.

MS. ALTMAN: Good morning Madame Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Court. My name is Taylor Altman and I'm a first year law student.

Judicial discussion of the United States Constitution frequently involves the debate over theories of interpretation such as plain meaning versus the constitution. Why do you think the California Supreme Court has been able to largely avoid this debate in its discussions of the California Constitution? Is it because of the particular nature of the California Constitution or something else?

CHIEF JUSTICE CANTIL-SAKAUYE: Justice Werdegar.

JUSTICE WERDEGAR: Yes. Thank you for that question. It is an interesting question which I pondered. And what I'm going to say, I agree it is true that our court and the justices of our court have largely avoided engaging in debate about theories of original intent, plain meaning within the constitution, such as the United States Supreme Court Justices have often done, publicly and vociferously.

That is not to say that we haven't had divisions of opinion as to how to approach interpreting our California Constitution. We have.

And the most recent example would be in the case of *Strauss v. Horton*, which was the case where Proposition 8 was challenged.

Proposition 8, you will recall, amended or purported to change the California Constitution to say that marriage is only between a man and a woman. In so doing, it purported to change the earlier decision of this court that under the Constitution equal protection allowed for marriage of same sex couples.

So along came the case. The proponents of Proposition 8 argued that the initiative was invalid because it revised the California Constitution, and the proper procedures for revision had not taken place. And they claimed it revised the Constitution because it impacted fundamental liberties.

The majority in that case rejected the view of objectors and held, relying on language in prior cases of ours, that a revision of the constitution occurs only when there is a change in the basic structure of state government or the power is given to the different branches, and that a mere tweaking of who could marry did not satisfy as a revision, so the initiative was valid.

A concurring opinion took a different point of view on the question of revision versus amendment. And that opinion disputed that a revision was only when there was a change in the structure of the government, and it could occur if there was a fundamental altering in individual liberties.

In taking that position, the concurring opinion referred to the 1849 California Constitutional Convention, and the comments of delegates to that convention, and also to the 1878-1879 California Constitutional Convention. The concurring opinion extracted comments from those conventions that the intention was certainly that fundamental individual liberties of the citizens being altered would render the change to be a revision.

And that's not the only case. So you might call that concurring opinion "original intent" and the majority opinion "the living constitution."

I think, fortunately, the justices of our court and our opinions don't use those labels. And why do I say that? Because those labels have become freighted with political connotations that I think obscure the complicated and thoughtful reasoning that goes into either point of view.

But our court has debated how to approach interpreting our constitution in a number of other cases. And if the majority doesn't rely on the constitutional conventions, then the dissent will invoke the constitutional conventions.

Let me add that so many of the provisions of our Constitution come to us by way of initiative. And when that's the case, then the meaning of the initiative is not patently clear and the court needs to interpret it, it always goes to the voter's pamphlet because that is where the purported will of the people is expressed, and our job is to implement that will, if we validate.

So we do have our debates, but they are not as high profile, and they don't bare the labels. You might be interested in the first case being argued after lunch, the *Beeman* case, where it does raise the question of how do we interpret our liberty speech provision, California Constitution, article 1, section 2.

Thank you.

MR. BOOTH: Good morning Madame Chief Justice and associate justices. My name is Norris Booth and I'm a second year law student here at Boalt. And I'm so pleased that all of you have come here to Boalt today.

My question is for Justice Baxter.

How does the California Supreme Court balance its simultaneous, yet at some point, conflicting roles as a separate and independent branch of state government; an impartial decision maker; an arbitrator of the common law; and an occasional policy maker?

JUSTICE BAXTER: Good morning, Norris. Good morning ladies and gentlemen.

Frankly, I was hoping for a softball, but you pitched me an excellent and thought-provoking question. I'm not sure that even a law review article could do it justice. But I'll give it my best shot in the few minutes that I have.

The word "balance" really is the key to performing our different roles. And the best short answer to your question is that the balance comes largely from the constitutional principle of checks and balances.

The tensions and conflicts you described can't be avoided because they are built in on purpose to make sure that none of the three independent branches, the legislative, the executive or the judicial gets out of hand. The courts play their part, but our power, like that of the two other branches, is very carefully limited. So this means that we don't have to do the balancing ourselves. Instead, it's a never-ending dance, a three-way balancing act between our different branches of government.

And speaking in the most general terms, the Legislature's job is to enact laws, the executive branch carries out those laws, and the judicial branch is assigned the task of interpreting the law. And this judicial function of interpreting the law has three very important parts.

First of all, a case may require a court to interpret the meaning of a statute or a regulation. But the court can't just choose the meaning it likes best based on its own idea of good policy. Instead, the court must try its best to figure out the actual intent of the measure. And if the court gets it wrong, the Legislature or the executive agency can fix the mistake by simply amending the statute or regulation to make its meaning more clear.

Second, life produces some disputes which the constitution, the statutes and regulations simply do not address. An ancient tradition we inherited from England, courts do have authority through their decisions and lawsuits to make law, and even to establish policy in areas where the Constitution and the other branches of government have not done so. And this, of course, is the common law that you mention in your question. And, obviously, this is an area where courts have some freedom to shape the law. But here again, the other two branches have the "trump card," and they can use it any time they wish. Any policy a court has made as a matter of common law can simply be changed by a valid statute or executive regulation.

Third, that famous U.S. Supreme Court case decided in 1803, *Marbury v. Madison*, established that courts have authority to interpret the constitution. And this includes the power to declare that a statute or regulation is unconstitutional, and therefore unenforceable. This constitutional power of the courts is a necessary final check on the other to two branches of government.

The Constitution creates a political system that is responsive to the popular will. But it also seeks to restrain popular politics from infringing on certain individual rights and liberties that can never be denied by recognizing the ultimate constitutional power of the judiciary, the branch furthest removed from political influence. Our society employs the best means it knows to balance those purposes.

Now, courts govern themselves so as to minimize constitutional confrontations. Thus the court, including this court, will make every honest effort to avoid deciding a constitutional issue in the first place. If a court can reach a fair and legally sound judgment on grounds that have nothing to do with the constitution, it will do so. And a court won't accept a possibly unconstitutional interpretation of a statute or regulation if there is another reasonable construction that saves the measure from constitutional difficulties. When we can't avoid addressing constitutional issues, we treat them with the greatest possible care and concern. And there may be honest differences of opinion about how to approach a particular constitutional question. But in every case, all the knowledge, the wisdom, the judgment of each member of the court is brought to bear to reach a decision that best reflects the constitution's meaning.

Getting to the balance, the correct balance, is not easy, but the role we play in interpreting the constitution, the role we play in interpreting statutes, the role we play in our society, is a very interesting, challenging, and a very, very fulfilling role.

Thank you for your excellent question.

MR. BOOTH: Thank you.

CHIEF JUSTICE CANTIL-SAKAUYE: Thank you Mr. Booth.

MS. WU: Good morning justices. My name is Claudia Wu and I'm a junior at Balboa High School. What are your favorite and least favorite things about your job as an associate justice of the California Supreme Court?

CHIEF JUSTICE CANTIL-SAKAUYE: Justice Corrigan.

JUSTICE CORRIGAN: I know the answer to this. That's a very good question though, Claudia. And I think I and my colleagues are among those very lucky people who enjoy almost everything about our work.

We are asked to resolve challenging and important questions brought to us by exceptionally able advocates. And writing an opinion is a little like solving a very complicated puzzle. You have to break down the question, and then you have to solve it, and then you have to explain how and why you got to the answer you got to.

I think we all really enjoy that process of trying to explain the law and to explain our resolutions in ways that are clear, that can be fairly well applied by judges and lawyers, and all of us in society who look to the law for even-handed justice.

You know, the only thing we know about the law is what we say about it in words. We can't weigh it, we can't look at it under a microscope, we can't inquire into its atomic weight. The law lives within its language. So when we choose that language in writing our opinions, it's very important we choose those words wisely and to make them clear. It's that process of crafting the opinion and hoping to guide the future of the law that is really one of the most exciting parts about this job that we are privileged to do. So it's terrific. Indoor work with no heavy lifting. It's great.

I guess if I had to articulate one thing that is among my least favorite things, like many Californians, I'd probably say it's my commute from the East Bay to San Francisco.

Thank you for your question.

CHIEF JUSTICE CANTIL-SAKAUYE: Thank you, Ms. Wu.

MS. MALHOTRA: Good morning Madame Chief Justice and Associate Justices. My name is Shvata Malhotra, and I'm a senior at De Anza High School.

Madame Chief Justice, you are the first Filipina American, and only the second woman to serve as Chief Justice of California. How did your own experience demonstrate the value of diversity on the bench?

CHIEF JUSTICE CANTIL-SAKAUYE: Thank you for that question. And I think, Justice Baxter, I got the softball, because I hope here at a public university and preeminent public law school, and speaking about the value of diversity, I hope I truly am preaching to the choir.

I want to take a point of privilege to point out that the California Supreme Court is majority women, and majority Asian American. I also want to say that years ago I was probably considered the diverse person in the room as a lawyer or as a judge.

Frankly, I thought that those old male Caucasian men were the diverse people. And so I fast forward years now, 23 -- some 30 years forward, and let me say in answer to your question about my experience demonstrating the value of diversity, my experience has been enriched and informed by the diversity of my judicial colleagues, the lawyers who have appeared before me, fourteen years on the trial court bench and listening to expert witnesses and picking countless juries and finding out what they think about the system and why they can or cannot be fair. All of those kinds of opinions and analyses have helped form me as a person, as a parent, as a citizen and as a jurist.

Let me say, when I speak of diversity, I intend the word broadly. I intend it to be geographical diversity, cultural diversity, gender diversity, and on and on, including professional diversity because conversations, dialogue, the give and take, the interaction with people from diverse backgrounds, it does several things. And the first thing that comes to mind is it informs all of us, gives a better, greater, global perspective, and it forever changes our analysis. When we think about an issue, we will think about the different voices in the room we've been with to consider the solution.

The other value of diversity that I have experienced over the years is something that Justice Kennard referred to. It tests the results. When you have a number of people with different backgrounds who look to a project or to solve an issue or to get a resolution, it is the global perspective that everyone brings that tests the ultimate result. It tests the hypothesis and refines the conclusion. And for that reason alone in the branch, the value of diversity is priceless.

I also want to point out that looking at California alone, over 10-million-plus immigrants in the state population of 38 million, where we now know that, at this point in time and snapshot of our history, we are a majority-minority state, how imperative it is that diversity be inherent in all of our projects and committees and all of our associations and memberships. The value is priceless to getting to the right decision.

Before I conclude, I do want to thank Balboa High School and De Anza High School for your focus on civics education, bringing students here with law students to a public university, exposing them to higher education, graduate education, and the third branch of government in action.

Thank you.

MS. MALHOTRA: Thank you.

CHIEF JUSTICE CANTIL-SAKAUYE: That concludes our question and answer period. I'll have Frank McGuire, the clerk, call the calendar.